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Abstract 
At the end of 2000 Lisa and Janet Miller-Jenkins left their home state of Virginia 
and traveled to Vermont to enter into a civil union.  Their union ended a few years later.  
Although their separation resulted in a bitter legal battle in both the Virginia and Vermont 
court systems neither state addressed whether the initial union was valid. This paper 
analyzes the civil union using the Second Restatement’s choice of law principles.  This 
paper concludes that although the courts have continued to haggle over whether full faith 
and credit must be given to conflicting visitation orders the choice of law analysis shows 
that Lisa and Janet never entered into a valid union.  
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3The U.S. is composed of a number of territorial sister states each having a unique 
and independent system of laws. Americans regularly move across state lines which 
means that legal issues can arise which have connections to more than one jurisdiction.1
When this happens the question is often which state’s law should apply to the case.  This 
question can arise in any of the affairs of modern life, but perhaps is most intrusive when 
it determines the legality of our most intimate relationships.  In 1948 Justice Jackson 
wrote, “If there is one thing that the people are entitled to expect from their lawmakers, it 
is rules of law that will enable individuals to tell whether they are married and, if so, to 
whom.” 2 However, over fifty years later many people still fall victim to conflict of law 
snares which can result in their marriage not being valid or not being recognized by a 
sister state. 
Many couples are not aware that through the act of marriage they are surrendering 
themselves to the quagmire of choice of law.  The couple may believe that because their 
union is recognized in one state it must be recognized in all states, but this is far from the 
truth.  The forum state’s choice of law rules will determine which law, its own or a sister 
state’s, should apply to a given fact scenario to determine the rights, duties and 
responsibilities of the parties when the case involves more than one state or jurisdiction.3
The general rule under the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws (hereafter Second 
Restatement) is that if a marriage is valid and recognized in the state in which it is 
entered it is valid in all states.4 However, there are several exceptions to this rule as well 
 
1 RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971). 
2 Estin v. Estin 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948).  
3 RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 cmt. (a)(3) (1971).  
4 Id. § 283(2) (1971). 
4as a hard to predict public policy exception.5 The public policy exception is particularly 
relevant when dealing with same-sex marriages or civil unions.  
Hawai’i started the push to recognize same-sex marriages in 1993 with the case 
Baehr v. Lewin.6 In Baehr a few same-sex couples challenged a Hawai’i statute 
prohibiting same-sex couples to marry.7 The couples requested the right to marry and 
eventually appealed to the Hawai’i Supreme Court.8 The Hawai’i Supreme Court held 
that the ban against same-sex marriage was contrary to the Hawaiian constitutional 
prohibition against sex discrimination and thus unconstitutional unless the State could 
show, on remand, that the statute was narrowly tailored to suit a compelling state 
interest.9 In response to the Hawai’i ruling states across the country scrambled to amend 
their laws and constitutions so that they could avoid having to recognize same-sex 
marriages which might be performed in Hawai’i.10 As of 2005, forty states had laws on 
the books declaring that they would not recognize same-sex marriages and that such 
marriages are against their public policy.11 This has resulted in many same-sex couples 
being uncertain as to whether their marriage will be recognized outside the state in which 
it was entered.  The question may be further complicated if states distinguish between 
prohibitions against same-sex marriage versus civil unions.  This uncertainty is aptly 
demonstrated by the Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins case which is currently working its 
way through both the Vermont and the Virginia court systems.   
 
5 Id. See also § 132. 
6 See generally Baehr v. Lewin 853 P.2d 44 (1993).  
7 Id.  
8 Id.  
9 Id. at 68.  
10 Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex Marriage and Public Policy: The Miscegenation Precedents, 16 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV 105 (1996).  
11 Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for 
Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2149 (2005).   
5At the end of 2000 Lisa and Janet Miller-Jenkins left their home state of Virginia 
and traveled to Vermont to enter into a civil union.12 Their union was short lived 
however, and eventually resulted in a prolonged legal battle in the states of Vermont and 
Virginia with both states issuing contrary rulings.13 Neither the Vermont nor the Virginia 
court addressed the initial validity of the marriage through a choice of law analysis and 
focused instead on full faith and credit and the Parental Kidnapping and Prevention Act.  
This paper will analyze the validity of the Miller-Jenkins marriage using the Second 
Restatement’s choice of law principles.  Although the courts have continued to haggle 
over whether full faith and credit must be given to conflicting visitation orders the choice 
of law analysis shows that Lisa and Janet never entered into a valid union.   
The Miller-Jenkins Case 
For several years Lisa and Janet lived together in an intimate and openly lesbian 
relationship in the state of Virginia.14 Virginia prohibited same-sex marriages or civil 
unions at that time and continues to prohibit them today.  In December of 2000, while 
domiciliaries of Virginia, Lisa and Janet traveled to Vermont where they entered into a 
civil union and then returned to their home in Virginia.15 The couple later decided that 
they wanted a child.16 In 2002 Lisa became pregnant through artificial insemination.17 
Lisa and Janet chose a sperm donor who had physical characteristics resembling Janet’s 
 
12 Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, Nos. 2004-443, 2005-030, 2006 WL 2192715 at ¶ 3 (A.2d 2006). See 
also Appellant Opening Brief, Virginia Court of Appeals at 6, available at 
http://www.acluva.org/docket/pleadings/miller-jenkins_openingbrief.pdf (last visited Dec 15, 2006). 
13 Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, Nos. 2004-443, 2005-030, 2006 WL 2192715 at ¶ 3 (A.2d 2006). 
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id. See also Appellant Opening Brief, Virginia Court of Appeals at 6, available at 
http://www.acluva.org/docket/pleadings/miller-jenkins_openingbrief.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2006). 
17 Id.  
6with the hopes that the child would resemble both of them.18 Lisa gave birth to a baby 
girl, Isabella, in April of 2002 in Virginia.19 Janet was present in the delivery room 
during Isabella’s birth20 but was not listed as a parent on the Virginia birth certificate.21 
Lisa and Janet decided to move their family to Vermont in August of 2002 when Isabella 
was four months old.22 Janet, Lisa and Isabella lived together in Vermont for a little over 
one year before Janet and Lisa decided to separate in the fall of 2003.23 
In September of 2003, after Janet and Lisa had separated, Janet rented a moving 
truck and drove Lisa and Isabella back to Virginia and then returned to Vermont alone.24 
Janet and Lisa agreed that Lisa would file a pro se dissolution proceeding.25 Lisa filed 
for dissolution of the civil union in Vermont on November 24, 2003 identifying her 
daughter as a biological or adoptive child of a civil union in the complaint.26 In addition 
to filing for dissolution of the civil union Lisa completely renounced her lesbian life-
style.27 
On March 15, 2004 the Vermont Rutland Family Court held its first day of 
hearings on Janet’s motion for a temporary order regarding parental rights and 
responsibilities with regards to Isabella.28 On June 17, 2004 the Vermont court issued a 
 
18 Appellant Opening Brief, Virginia Court of Appeals, at 6 available at 
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7temporary order in which they awarded Lisa legal and physical responsibility of Isabella 
and awarded Janet temporary parent-child contact.29 
On July 1, 2004 Lisa filed a “Petition to Establish Parentage and for Declaratory 
Relief” in the Frederick County Circuit Court of Virginia.30 In her petition Lisa asked 
that the court declare her Isabella’s sole parent, that she alone had legal and physical 
custody of Isabella and that Janet had no rights of any kind regarding Isabella.31 Upon 
learning that Lisa had filed a concurrent action to determine parentage in Virginia the 
Vermont court issued an order on July 19, 2004 stating that the Vermont court would 
continue to have jurisdiction over the case including all parent-child contact issues.32 On 
August 24, 2004 the Virginia court ruled that it could exercise proper jurisdiction over 
the matter.33 
On Oct 15, 2004 the Virginia court ruled that Lisa alone was a parent to Isabella 
and that Janet had no parental rights.34 On November 17, 2004 the Vermont court 
entered an order declaring Janet to be one of Isabella’s parents.35 The court stated that 
“where a legally connected couple utilizes artificial insemination to have a family, 
parental rights and obligations are determined by facts showing intent to bring a child 
into the world and raise the child as one’s own as part of a family unit, not by biology.”36 
The Vermont court also stated that Virginia had inappropriately exercised jurisdiction 
over the parentage issue and had acted in violation of the Uniform Child Custody 
 
29 Id.  
30 Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, Appellant Opening Brief, Virginia Court of Appeals at 2, available at 
http://www.acluva.org/docket/pleadings/miller-jenkins_openingbrief.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2006). 
31 Id. at 8.  
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 9.  
34 Id.  
35 Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, Supreme Court of Vermont Appellate Brief 2005 WL 1386643 (Vt.) at 
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36 Id. citing Printed Case at 19.  
8Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act as 
codified by Virginia.37 Appeals were made both to the Virginia and the Vermont 
supreme courts. 38 
POINTS OF CONFLICT: WAS THIS MARRIAGE VALID? 
 
Although the Vermont Court assumed that Janet and Lisa’s civil union was valid 
and therefore proceeded to adjudicate the incidents of the union, a Second Restatement  
conflict of law analysis points to the union not being valid at the time it was entered into 
in Vermont, not being valid during the time Janet and Lisa lived in Virginia, and not 
being valid when the union was adjudicated in Vermont in 2004. 
Civil Union Not Valid in 2000 
Since the early part of the twentieth century Vermont has stated that a marriage 
entered in the state of Vermont by a person residing, and intending to continue to reside, 
in another state will be null and void in Vermont if the marriage would be void in the 
couple’s home state.39 This general rule against validating evasive marriages which take 
place in Vermont makes sense.  Home states have the right to govern the rights, 
responsibilities and status of their own residents.40 Vermont’s state interest is in its own 
citizens and not in the citizens of sister states.  Vermont has a particular interest in the 
familial status of its residents because of the rights and responsibilities which flow from 
that status such as parental rights and rights of inheritance.   
Vermont doesn’t have any state interest in regulating the rights and 
responsibilities of her sister states’ citizens.  In 1999 the Vermont Supreme Court 
 
37 Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, Appellant Opening Brief, Virginia Court of Appeals at 10, available at 
http://www.acluva.org/docket/pleadings/miller-jenkins_openingbrief.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).   
38 See Appendix A for a timeline of the Vermont and Virginia litigation.  
39 15 Vt. .Stat. .Ann. § 6.  
40 Supra note 11 at 2153.    
9decided the case Baker v. State stating that a prohibition against same-sex marriages 
violated the Vermont’s state constitution and ordered the state legislature to rectify the 
problem.41 In response the legislature created a right to civil unions for same-sex 
couples in Vermont. The Vermont civil union statute does not explicitly state a 
prohibition against evasive civil unions.  However, the statute does state that the law of 
domestic relations shall apply to civil unions.42 This seems to suggest that Vermont’s 
long standing policy against recognizing evasive marriages in Vermont might apply with 
equal force to evasive civil unions taking place in Vermont.  The policy reasons for such 
a rule remain the same as Vermont’s state interest remains with its own citizens even in 
the civil union context.  If this is the case then Janet and Lisa never entered into a valid 
civil union which should be recognized by Vermont under the Vermont statutes. 
Similarly, since 1975 Virginia law has stated that same-sex marriages are 
prohibited in Virginia.43 Virginia law also has a prohibition against evasive same-sex 
marriages stating that a same-sex marriage entered into in another state shall be void in 
Virginia and unenforceable.44 Although the Virginia statute at the time of Lisa and 
Janet’s union only mentioned same-sex marriages it is likely to have applied to civil 
unions as well.  Thus, both Virginia and Vermont had laws prohibiting the validation of 
evasive same-sex marriages and civil unions at the time Lisa and Janet entered their 
union which means that their union was likely void in both states at the time it was 
entered. 
 
41 See generally Baker v. State 170 VT 194 (1999).  
42 15 Vt. Stat. .Ann. § 1204(d).  
43 Va. Code Ann. § 20-45.2. 
44 Id.  
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Second Restatement Conflict of Law Analysis  
The result is the same under a Second Restatement analysis even assuming that the 
Vermont civil union statute would recognize evasive civil unions as valid within the 
state of Vermont.  The Second Restatement states that the validity of a marriage will be 
determined by the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship to the 
spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in section six of the restatement.45 
Section six of the restatement sets out seven factors to consider when determining which 
state has the most significant relationship with the spouses.  These are: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of  
those states in the determination of the particular issue 
(d) the protection of justified expectations 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result  
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.46 
Needs of Interstate and International Systems 
Considerations of the needs of the interstate system point to Virginia law 
controlling the Miller-Jenkins dissolution.  Perhaps the most important function of these 
choice of law principles is to ensure the interstate system functions smoothly.47 Choice 
of law principles should seek harmonious relations between the states and facilitate 
 
45 RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(1) (1971). 
46 Id. at § 6  
47 Id. at § 6 cmt. (d).  
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travel and commerce.48 Further, such choice of law principles should enhance the 
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result no matter which forum the matter is 
adjudicated in.49 In this case we can see just how discordant interstate adjudications can 
become with both Vermont and Virginia reaching opposite conclusions. In addition, 
applying Vermont law to the dissolution does not further certainty, predictability and 
uniformity of result.  In this case, the union would never have been recognized in 
Virginia but might pop into existence merely because the parties moved to Vermont.  
This result would likely have been different if they had moved to a different state and 
sought a dissolution there.  It is not practical for the parties, or for the states, to have a 
union and all its incidental rights and responsibilities, popping in and out of existence 
depending on which state the couple happens to be located in.  This suggests that the law 
of the couples’ home state at the time they entered their marriage should control.  In 
some cases, where the couple has spent the majority of their married life in a state other 
than their home state at the time of their union, the second state will have a more 
significant relationship to the marriage and therefore its law should apply to the 
marriage.  However, this is not the case with the Miller-Jenkins facts.  In the current case 
the parties spent the majority of their union in Virginia, they continued to have strong 
ties to Virginia while living in Vermont, Lisa and Isabella have moved back to Virginia 
and have continued to live there for the last three years.  These continued and intimate 
contacts with Virginia before, at the inception, during and after the union indicate that 
Virginia law should apply. 
 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
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Relevant Policies of the Forum 
 Considerations of Vermont’s relevant policies point to Virginia law controlling.  
Vermont’s policies on evasive marriages prohibit Vermont from recognizing such 
marriages and declares them void within the state of Vermont.50 In cases where an 
evasive marriage takes place in Vermont and is later adjudicated in Vermont, Vermont is 
likely to look to the couple’s home state policies regarding such marriages at the time 
the marriage took place to determine the couple’s rights and responsibilities.  The same 
is likely to be true of evasive civil unions conducted in Vermont and later adjudicated in 
Vermont.  This will be especially true if Vermont’s only interest in the case is because it 
is the forum state.  In our case, Vermont does have an interest in the parties, especially 
Janet because she has continued to be domiciled in Vermont.  However, this interest is 
unlikely to overrule the statutory language of 15 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 6 which states that 
Vermont will not recognize evasive marriages conducted within Vermont and such 
marriages are null and void.51 
Relevant Policies of Other Interested States and the Interests of those States in 
the Determination of the Particular Issue 
 The only state’s interested in this case are Vermont and Virginia.  Virginia’s 
relevant policies and interests suggest that Virginia law should apply.  The Second 
Restatement’s commentary states that the forum should seek to reach a result that will 
achieve the best possible accommodation of other interested state’s policies.52 From the 
continued litigation we know that Virginia courts have reached the opposite conclusion 
 
50 15 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 6. 
51 Id.  
52 RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. (f) (1971).  
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of the Vermont courts holding instead that there was no recognized union in Virginia 
and that Lisa is Isabella’s sole legal parent. Because applying Vermont law will reach a 
result diametrically opposite to that which Virginia would reach suggests that Vermont 
should have applied Virginia law under the Second Restatement. 
 The second restatement goes on to state that, in general, the state whose interests 
are most deeply affected should have its own local law applied to the case.53 In this case 
it appears that Virginia’s interests are most deeply affected.  Lisa and Janet were 
domiciliaries of Virginia when they entered the civil union.54 By traveling to Vermont 
to enter into the civil union they purposefully evaded the laws of Virginia, their home 
state.  After entering the union the couple continued to reside within Virginia and 
eventually gave birth to Isabella within Virginia.55 Virginia would not recognize the 
union as demonstrated by Virginia’s court order stating that Janet had no parental rights 
and by the fact that Virginia listed only Lisa as a parent on Isabella’s birth certificate.56 
Throughout the first three years of the civil union Virginia was the only state with an 
interest in the couple’s domestic status and the incidents from any union.  The couple 
moved to Vermont in 2003 and they resided there as a couple for approximately one 
year, after which Lisa and Isabella returned to Virginia and have continued to reside 
there to this day. 57 Although Janet has continued to reside in Vermont the couple has 
had more continuous contact with Virginia which suggests that Virginia law should 
apply.  
 
53 Id.  
54 See generally Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins 2006 WL 2192715.   
55 Id.  
56 Supreme Court of Vermont Appellate Brief 2005 WL 1386643 (Vt.) at *1 
57 Id.  
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Protection of Justified Expectations  
 Although the justified expectations are difficult to determine it appears that they  
point to applying Virginia’s law.  Both Lisa and Janet were domiciled in Virginia during 
2000 when they became parties to a civil union.58 It is likely that both Lisa and Janet 
knew that Virginia would not recognize a civil union in 2000 as evidenced by the fact 
that the couple was forced to avail themselves to the laws of a sister state in order to 
enter into such a union.  In addition Virginia law stated that no same-sex marriages 
would be recognized within the state of Virginia irregardless of whether the marriage 
was legal where it was entered if the parties were Virginia domiciliaries at the time of 
the marriage.59 Further, both Lisa and Janet knew that Virginia did not recognize Janet 
as one of Isabella’s parents as evidenced by the fact that the Virginia birth certificate 
listed only Lisa as a parent 60 and they never rectified this by having Janet adopt Isabella.  
There is also the fact that Vermont is likely not to recognize evasive civil unions which 
take place within its borders.  Vermont certainly did not affirmatively state that it would 
recognize evasive civil unions entered within Vermont and Vermont’s statute stating that 
it would not recognize evasive marriages entered within its border suggests that it would 
not recognize evasive civil unions.61 Given all this it seems likely that both Lisa and 
Janet’s justified expectations point to Virginia law controlling.  Certainly the parties 
would not be justified in thinking that a union which was illegal in their home state 
should pop into existence merely because the couple briefly moved to Vermont just a 
parties who were legally married in their home state would not be justified in expecting 
 
58 See generally Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 WL 2192715.   
59 Va. Code Ann. §20 45-2 
60 Supreme Court of Vermont Appellate Brief 2005 WL 1386643 (Vt.) at *1 
61 15 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 6.  
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the marriage to become void merely because they briefly moved to a sister state.  This 
suggests that Virginia law controlled when they entered the marriage and the couple’s 
justified expectations point to Virginia law controlling now. 
Basic Policies Underlying the Field of Domestic Law 
 The basic policies underlying the field of family law seem to cancel each other 
out and not play a big part in the analysis.  Basic principles underlying this area of 
domestic relations could be seen as the general rule of validation which states that a 
marriage legal where it is performed is legal everywhere.62 However, this rule has 
several recognized exceptions as well as a more amorphous public policy exception63 
which the Miller-Jenkins case might slip into.  In addition there is the equally strong 
underlying policy that saying that states should have the power to determine the status of 
their citizens along with any incidental rights and responsibilities of that status. 64 This 
policy points to Virginia controlling.  Because of the equally strong underlying policy 
considerations pointing to both Virginia law and Vermont law this indicator is not 
controlling.  
Certainty, Predictability and Uniformity of Result 
Certainty, predictability and uniformity of result point to application of Virginia 
law.  Virginia was the place of domicile when Lisa and Janet entered into their civil 
union.  Their home state of Virginia had the greatest interest in determining the status of 
the parties at that time and if Virginia had adjudicated the question then it would likely 
have held that their was no valid civil union.  It would not further predictability and 
 
62 RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. (h) (1971). 
63 Id. at § 283(2). 
64 Supra note 11 at 2153.   
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uniformity of result to apply Vermont law to the case now.  Applying Vermont law to 
the case will reach a result directly contrary to the result which would have been, and 
now has been, reached in Virginia resulting in the parties’ status as members of a civil 
union to pop in and out of existence depending on whether they are in Vermont or 
Virginia.  This type of erratic result is exactly what choice of law rules seek to avoid.   
Ease in the Determination and Application of the Law 
 This indicator is not directly implicated by this case and so does not sway the 
result of the analysis either towards Vermont or Virginia law.  No unreasonable 
administrative hurdles would be set up by requiring Vermont to apply Virginia law. 
 Thus, a section six Second Restatement analysis points to Virginia as the state 
with the most significant relationship with the spouses and the union so Virginia law 
should determine the validity of the union.   
Second Restatement Public Policy Analysis 
 The Second Restatement codifies the general rule of validation stating that a 
marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was entered 
will be recognized as valid everywhere unless it violates the strong public policy of 
another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage 
at the time of the union.65 Assuming that the rule of validation would apply with equal 
force to civil unions and assuming that Lisa and Janet did meet the legal requirements of 
Vermont when they entered their civil union the union is still likely to be void under the 
Second Restatement because it violated the strong public policy of Virginia, the state 
with the most significant relationship at the time of the union.   
 
65 RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971). 
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To date, marriages have been held invalid only when the marriage violated a 
strong policy of a state where at least one of the spouses was domiciled at the time of the 
marriage and where both made their home immediately following the marriage.66 In the 
Miller-Jenkins case both Lisa and Janet were domiciled in Virginia when the they 
entered their civil union and both made their home in Virginia immediately after 
entering the union.  
In 2000, at the time of Lisa and Janet’s union, Virginia explicitly prohibited 
same-sex marriages but was silent on the validity of civil unions within the state of 
Virginia.67 Lisa and Janet attempted to evade the laws of their home state of Virginia by 
traveling to Vermont to enter into a civil union and then immediately returning to their 
home in Virginia.  The question is whether Janet and Lisa violated the strong public 
policy of their home state at the time of their marriage.   
Under these circumstances Vermont, the forum state, should have determined 
whether Virginia’s statutory prohibition against same-sex marriages represented a 
sufficiently strong policy of the state of most significant relationship to warrant 
invalidation of the civil union.68 The Second Restatement says that the most 
determinative factor the forum state should consider is whether the courts of the state 
with the most significant relationship would have invalidated the marriage if the 
question had come before them.69 In this case it is clear that Virginia would have ruled 
that the union was invalid.  At the time of the union Virginia statute prohibited same-sex 
marriage and refused to recognize evasive same-sex marriages by Virginia domiciliaries 
 
66 Id § 283 cmt. (2)(j).  
67 Va. Code Ann. § 20 45-2.  
68 RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 Cmt. 2(j) (1971).  
69 Id.  
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as valid in Virginia70 which suggests that Virginia would not recognize a civil union 
either.  Virginia did not recognize Janet as a parent when Isabella was born listing only 
Lisa as a parent on the birth certificate.71 The Virginia courts have gone on to rule that 
Janet is not a legal parent to Isabella.72 Furthermore, in 2004 Virginia codified its public 
policy against recognizing civil unions stating that a civil union entered outside the state 
of Virginia shall be void in all respects within the state of Virginia.73 Given these 
factors it seems evident that Virginia’s public policy against same-sex marriages or civil 
unions is sufficiently strong to require that Vermont apply the public policy exception 
when determining the validity of the marriage.  Thus, Lisa and Janet’s civil union was 
never valid under the Second Restatement.  Although the Second Restatement appears to 
point to there being no valid union at any time this is certainly not a satisfying answer.  
Public Policy Exception Problems Are Nothing New 
The public policy exception has long legitimized states’ deep rooted hatred and 
intolerance for certain groups.  Historically, marriages held invalid because they violated 
the strong public policy of the home state were bigamous, incestuous and interracial 
marriages or marriages that involved paramour statutes. 
For example, in 1951 Fred Catalano, a citizen of Connecticut, traveled to Italy 
where he married his niece.74 The marriage was legal and recognized in Italy where it 
was performed.75 Mr. Catalano returned to Connecticut after the nuptials and Mrs. 
 
70 Va. Code Ann. § 20 45-2 
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Catalano joined him there in 1956 and shortly thereafter she gave birth to a son.  The 
family lived in Hartford until Mr. Catalano’s death in 1958 upon which Mrs. Catalano, 
believing herself to be the surviving spouse of Mr. Catalano, brought an action for 
support and provisions under Connecticut law.76 However, Connecticut refused to grant 
her support and provisions because it refused to recognize her marriage as valid.77 The 
court stated that although marriages valid where they are celebrated are usually valid 
everywhere this was not the case for Mrs. Catalano.78 Mrs. Catalano’s marriage fell into 
the public policy exception to the general rule of validation.79 The Connecticut court 
stated that the Catalano’s union was in direct conflict with Connecticut’s policy against 
marriages between uncles and nieces as evidenced by the fact that such unions had been 
illegal in Connecticut since 1702 and the punishment for such marriages was 
imprisonment.80 
Another example is that of Richard H. Stull and Ada Widdup.  Richard and Ada 
were domiciled in Pennsylvania.81 Richard’s first wife had gotten a divorce based on 
Richard’s infidelity with Ada.82 Pennsylvania prohibited a marriage between an adulterer 
and his paramour during the lifetime of the injured spouse.83 After the divorce was 
finalized Richard and Ada traveled to Maryland where such marriages were allowed, got 
married, and then returned to Pennsylvania to live as husband and wife.84 Pennsylvania 
 
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 292.  
78 Id. at 291.  
79 Id. See also RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132(b) (1971).  
80 Catalano, 148 Conn. at 291-92.  
81 In re Stull’s Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 628 (1898).  
82 Id.  
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refused to recognize their marriage and upon Richard’s death Ada was unable to inherit 
Richard’s estate.85 
In Kennedy v. State a black man and a white woman domiciled in North Carolina 
evaded North Carolina’s prohibition against interracial marriages and traveled to South 
Carolina where they were legally married.86 After they were married the couple returned 
to North Carolina to live as husband and wife.87 North Carolina held that the marriage 
was not valid.88 
Likewise in Kinney v. Commonwealth a black man and a white woman both 
domiciled in Virginia where interracial marriages were prohibited traveled to the District 
of Columbia and entered into a valid marriage.89 In Kinney the court held that the 
marriage celebrated in the District of Columbia, though lawful there, was prohibited and 
declared void by the statutes of Virginia and invalid in Virginia.90 
It might be easy to dismiss these cases as archaic vestiges of a less enlightened 
past.  After all, in Loving v. Virginia the Supreme Court declared that prohibitions against 
interracial marriages unconstitutionally violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses.91 However, as Miller-Jenkins demonstrates, these 
problems are still very current.  Several state courts have thus far failed to extend the 
protections of Loving to same-sex marriages.  In Morrison v. Sadler an Indiana court 
refused to analogize prohibitions against same-sex marriages to prohibitions against 
interracial marriages stating that “unlike anti-miscegenation laws, restrictions against 
 
85 Id. at 637.   
86 Kennedy v. State, 76 N.C. 251, 252 (1877).  
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Kinney v. Commonwealth, 30 Gratt. 858 at *2 (1878).  
90 Id. at *7.  
91 Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
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same-sex marriage reinforce, rather than disrupt, the traditional understanding of 
marriage as a unique relationship between a woman and a man.”92 The Sadler court went 
on to state that Loving did not hold that the right to marry means the right to marry 
whomever one wants.93 Likewise, in Lewis v. Harris the New Jersey Supreme Court also 
refused to extend the Fourteenth Amendment protection of interracial marriages to same-
sex marriages.94 
In addition, the Federal Government has sought to strengthen public policy 
against same-sex marriage by passing the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and, 
as seen in Virginia, many states have followed suite by codifying their public policy 
exceptions against civil unions and same-sex marriages.  Thus there is a panoply of state 
laws, some legalizing civil unions, some legalizing gay marriage and many declaring 
same-sex unions void and against the state’s public policy.  All this has resulted in a 
maelstrom of litigation unfairly denying the validity of many same-sex unions just as the 
validity of interracial marriages was denied pre Loving v. Virginia.  
Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not currently protect same-sex unions 
from the pitfalls of the public policy exception, perhaps a better approach would be to 
follow the Second Restatement requirement of domicile to grant a divorce in marriage as 
well.  The Second Restatement states that the state of a person’s domicile has the most 
interest in that person’s marital status and therefore has judicial jurisdiction to grant the 
person a divorce.95 The policy reasons behind requiring domicile to grant a divorce apply 
 
92 Morrison v. Sadler WL 23119998 at *5 (2003).  
93 Id.  
94 Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 440 (2006).  See also Anderson v. King County, 158 Wash.2d 1 (2006), 
Hernandez v. Robles 7 N.Y.3d 338 (2006) Baker v. State 170 Vt. 194, 215 (1999) all distinguishing same-
sex marriage from interracial marriages protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.   
95 RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 285 cmt. (a)  (1971). 
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with equal strength to granting a marriage.  Had Vermont required Janet and Lisa to show 
they were domiciliaries of Vermont before granting them a civil union it would be clear 
that the marriage was valid and thus eliminating a need for a home state public policy 
exception. 
In conclusion, a Second Restatement analysis of the Miller-Jenkins case points to 
Virginia law controlling with the result that the civil union was not valid at the time it 
was entered nor at the time it was adjudicated.  However, this is not a satisfactory result 
for the countless couples struggling to obtain state recognition for their union that they 
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